**Case Study: Big Data in New York City Management**

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Summary

I would like to introduce the problem statement which causes the Government to implement Big Data in New York city. During 1980’s and 90’s New York city was very risky place to live due to lot of criminal activities. And when Mr William swore as commissioner of police, he worked really hard to decrease the crime rate in New York. He decided to implement computerized platform to track the criminal activities and as per the crime rate in a particular area the police department resources are allocated.

The Police Department's prosperity utilizing information investigation to improve administration conveyance drew the notification of other city offices—specifically, the New York City Fire Department (FDNY). In 2013, the office organized a modernized assessment framework dependent on complex and exceptional proportions of a structure's fire hazard and, similar to the Police Department, started guiding rare assets to the most elevated hazard regions. In 2002 Mr Bloomberg became the mayor in 2002. In 2013, he made another Mayor's Office of Data Analytics (MODA) with revealing connections and finding issues. So, this is how the inception of big data was laid in New York. Now I want to present the detailed analysis of the problem and the solution implemented by government.

Analysis

So, this all started from 1990 when New York city was struggling with criminal activities from last 2 decades and crime was raising exponentially in the city. City was going through a financial crisis and crime was critically responsible for that. Mr. Bratton was the commissioner of police at that time. Bratton had administered a decrease in tram wrongdoing as head of the New York City Transit Police from 1990-92. Grasping the novel "broken windows" hypothesis of policing, which set a connection between general issue and genuine wrongdoing, the travel police under Bratton forcefully authorized lower-level infractions, for example, farebeating. The rationale was that by taking action against minor infractions, NYPD could forestall progressively genuine wrongdoings. In 1994, a new job was assigned to him, he took helm of an a lot bigger and more mind boggling association than his past task at the Transit Police: about 50,000 cops liable for the open security of 7 million New Yorkers spread all through 76 areas. According to the real time data and Bratton’s opinion Police Department was competent of reacting to wrongdoing, however of proactively forestalling it. To do as such, notwithstanding, would require point by point information on where wrongdoings were destined to happen, and a key and convenient organization of assets. The NYPD definitely knew a great deal about wrongdoing. In any case, the reports were ordered quarterly, so information was at that point four months old when it arrived at police authorities. Despite the fact that point by point, the reports gave "the executives data history" as opposed to a reason for choices, says Smith. With wrongdoing designs that moved on a week by week or even regular schedule, Bratton felt police assets should move correspondingly.

Now coming to New York Police Department and Compstat, Maple in mid 1993 required every one of New York City's 76 regions to assemble wrongdoing measurements and guide wrongdoing areas day by day, at that point fax the data to central command. As Maple presented mechanical change, Bratton went to the division's administration. He degenerated extraordinary power to the city's 76 region authorities—every one of whom supervised around 200-400 cops serving approximately 100,000 inhabitants. Compstat changed the manner in which information was gathered, how assets were sent and how commandants were considered responsible. As Maple later condensed, its key segments were "exact and auspicious insight joined with powerful strategies, fast organization, tireless development and appraisal, and responsibility. A comparable move in mindset—from reacting to issues to forestalling them—would before long grab hold at other city offices. Among them was Parks and Recreation, which in March 1997 held its first Compstat-style meeting. The office named its variant ParkStat. Supervisors were urged to depict in detail advancements in each locale, and to conceptualize aggregate arrangements. Furthermore, the office actualized week after week execution surveys so as to build up an immediate association among base camp and park chiefs. By putting insights and direct correspondence at the cutting edge of park the board, ParkStat had the option to twofold the quantity of destinations passing examination.

Recommendation

Now I would like to answer the main issues presented in the case. In my opinion MODA should be continued as this helped in eradicating the crime from the city by providing the information to solve cross regional issues and preparing agency level volume for maintaining and analyzing the data. It had a drawback i.e it was very time consuming process. Also, it failed as it was unable to provide clear picture regarding the unit whether it will survive or not. Keeping in mind both advantages and dis-advantages we need another approach which should be executed in parallel to MODA to maintain a balance between centralization and decentralization and sharing of the information process should be improved where legitimate concerns included resident security and legal cutoff points on the authority of specific organizations.

References

“From Compstat to Gov 2.0: Big Data in New York City Management.” *From Compstat to Gov 2.0: Big Data in New York City Management | From Compstat to Gov 2.0 Big Data in New York City Management*, ccnmtl.columbia.edu/projects/caseconsortium/casestudies/127/casestudy/www/layout/case\_id\_127.html.